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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Cross-Appellant/ 
Petitioner, 
v. 
HANK GALETKA, Utah State 
Prison Warden, 
Cross-Appellee/ 
Respondent. 
Case No. 20040360-SC 
CROSS-APPELLEE GALETKA'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Menzies cross-appeals the district court's order 
requiring appellant Division of Finance to pay for his appellate 
costs. The district court entered the order in a proceeding 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) to set aside a judgment denying Mr. 
Menzies post-conviction relief from his capital murder conviction 
and death sentence. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(i) (West 2004).1 
xMr. Menzies asserts that the Court lacks jurisdiction over 
the Division of Finance's appeal because the order at issue is 
not a final appealable order. Cross-Appellant's Brief at 1-3. 
The Division of Finance has addressed that issue in its reply 
brief. Appellant's Reply Brief at 3-8. Of course, if 
jurisdiction over the Division's appeal fails, jurisdiction over 
the derivative cross-appeal will fail as well. 
In partial support of his jurisdictional argument, Mr. 
1 
ISSUE STATEMENT AND REVIEW STANDARD 
Where the Division of Finance has conceded its 
responsibility to pay for Mr. Menzies' appellate costs, may Mr. 
Menzies obtain a double recovery of those costs by requiring 
respondent to pay them as well? 
No review standard applies. The lower court ruled that the 
Division of Finance must pay Mr. Menzies' appellate costs. 
Consequently, the court did not resolve Mr. Menzies' argument 
that the respondent should have to pay those costs if the 
Division did not have to pay them. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the texts of Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46a-
12.1 and 78-35a-202 (West's 2004); Utah R. Civ. P. 7; and Utah 
Administrative Code R25-14-3 through 5. 
CASE STATEMENT 
Nearly two decades ago, Mr. Menzies kidnapped Maurine 
Hunsaker from her work. He held her until the following morning, 
when he drove her to Storm Mountain, tied her to a tree, 
strangled her, and slashed her throat. See generally State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 
Menzies asserts that there is no final order because the district 
court continues to hear matters. As one example, petitioner 
cites a State's motion to release evidence for DNA testing. 
Cross-Appellant's Brief at 2 n.l. The argument misstates the 
record. The State filed the motion in the criminal case, State 
v. Menzies, case nos. CR86-887 and 031102598. That case is not 
on appeal. 
2 
(1995). A jury convicted Mr. Menzies of capital murder, and 
Judge Raymond Uno sentenced him to death. Id. 
Mr. Menzies began post-conviction proceedings in 1995. 
After lengthy litigation, which included Mr. Menzies' failure to 
cooperate in discovery and resulting sanctions, the post-
conviction court, on January 11, 2002, entered judgment in 
respondent's favor. (See generally fact statement in 
respondent's Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment, R. 2410-33). 
Although Mr. Menzies filed a timely appeal notice in the 
post-conviction case and obtained a lengthy extension to file his 
post-conviction brief, he never filed a brief. The Court gave 
Mr. Menzies an opportunity to cure the default. When he did not, 
this Court, on December 19, 2002, made final its order dismissing 
the post-conviction appeal. (Id.) 
In August 2003, nearly eight months after this Court made 
its dismissal of the post-conviction appeal final, Mr. Menzies, 
relying on Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), filed a memorandum in support 
of relief from the post-conviction judgment against him (R. 2322-
53). The lower court denied Mr. Menzies relief from the post-
conviction judgment (R. 3701-69). Mr. Menzies appealed that 
outcome. Menzies v. Galetka, case no. 20040289 ("rule 60(b) 
3 
appeal").2 
Mr. Menzies also moved the district court to order "the 
government" to pay for his copy of a deposition taken during the 
rule 60(b) proceedings, for any transcripts his attorney ordered 
for the rule 60(b) appeal, and for his appellate printing costs 
(R. 3790-99). Respondent objected.3 The Division of Finance 
("the Division"), the State agency that administers the funds 
used to pay for capital post-conviction litigation, appeared and 
also objected (R. 3830-35). 
Mr. Menzies' and the Division's arguments focused on three 
Division administrative rules governing two separate funds for 
capital post-conviction litigation. Utah Administrative Code 
R25-14-3(2) provides that counsel appointed in capital post-
conviction cases "agree to accept as full compensation for the 
legal services performed and litigation costs incurred the 
amounts provided in the Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees 
2The Court has stayed the rule 60(b) appeal while petitioner 
supplements the record. 
Respondent filed his objection to the request; however, the 
district court has not made respondent's objection part of the 
record. Respondent has moved to supplement the record with the 
motion. To avoid delay, respondent has attached a copy bearing 
the district court's file stamp as Addendum B. 
Respondent indicated, among other things, the he had already 
paid the transcription costs of for most of the rule 60(b) 
hearings, including transcripts of the rule 60(b) evidentiary 
hearing, the argument on the rule 60(b) motion, and the district 
court's oral ruling denying rule 60(b) relief (R. 4134 at 15-16). 
4 
found in Section R25-14-4." (Emphasis added.) The Schedule of 
Payments provides for flat amounts payable to counsel upon the 
occurrence of certain events. Utah Administrative Code R25-14-4. 
Utah Admin. Rule 25-14-5 provides a separate fund of $20,000 
"for court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and 
consultants." 
The Division argued that the controlling rules' plain 
language required Mr. Menzies' counsel to pay for transcription 
and printing costs out of the flat fees paid to her for legal 
services and litigation costs. Mr. Menzies argued that the 
Division should pay for transcription and printing costs out of 
the $20,000 reserved for investigators, expert witnesses, and 
consultants, leaving the amounts paid for his counsel's services 
undiminished by such litigation costs. (R. 3792-99, 3830-35). 
The district court accepted Mr. Menzies' argument and 
ordered the Division to pay the transcription and printing costs 
out of the $20,000 designated for paying "court approved 
investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants" (R. 3907-3909) . 
The Division appealed that order (R. 3919-20). The district 
court did not resolve whether respondent had a separate 
obligation to pay for Mr. Menzies' appellate costs. 
Mr. Menzies timely filed his cross-appeal against 
respondent. According to Mr. Menzies, he filed the cross-appeal 
only to preserve the argument that respondent should have to pay 
5 
his appellate costs if the Division is not required to do so.4 
4In his brief, Mr. Menzies purports to seek alternative 
relief from the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office. Cross-
Appellant's Brief at 24-29. It does not appear that Mr. Menzies 
made the District Attorney's Office a party either below or on 
appeal. 
Mr. Menzies mailed a copy of the motion at issue to a deputy 
Salt Lake district attorney (R. 3828). However, the Salt Lake 
District Attorney has filed two non-party letters asserting that 
this was insufficient service to make the District Attorney a 
party to the rule 60(b) litigation below. Addendum C. 
Mr. Menzies' cross-appeal notice named only respondent as 
cross-appellee, and he served it only on respondent (R. 3917-18). 
Mr. Menzies subsequently filed an "amended" cross-appeal notice, 
purportedly adding the "original prosecuting entity" as a cross-
appellee (R. 3948-49). However, Mr. Menzies filed that notice 
thirty-four days after the district court entered the order from 
which Mr. Menzies' cross-appeals (R. 3904-3909) and twenty-one 
days after the Division filed its appeal notice (R. 3919). The 
cross-appeal against the "original prosecuting entity" is 
untimely. Utah R. App. P. 4(c). 
6 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THE DIVISION HAS CONCEDED THAT IT MUST PAY FOR 
MR. MENZIES' APPELLATE COSTS, MR. MENZIES CANNOT OBTAIN 
A DOUBLE RECOVER BY REQUIRING RESPONDENT TO PAY FOR 
THOSE COSTS AS WELL5 
In his cross-appeal, Mr. Menzies argues that, if the 
5Mr. Menzies relies on a variety of rule and constitutional 
arguments. Respondent does not agree that his cited authority 
establishes a separate obligation for respondent to pay Mr. 
Menzies' appellate costs. However, respondent has not addressed 
those arguments here because the Division has conceded its 
obligation to pay the costs. Any issue about a separate 
obligation of respondent is irrelevant. 
Respondent notes that Mr. Menzies did not preserve the rule 
arguments on which he relies. Mr. Menzies relies on Utah R. Civ. 
P. 65C as a basis for ordering respondent to pay those costs. 
Although Mr. Menzies cited that rule in the district court, 
respondent pointed out that, by its own terms, the rule did not 
apply (R. 4134 at 22). For the first time on appeal, Mr. Menzies 
offers a reason why the Court should apply rule 65C despite its 
plain language that it does not apply. Mr. Menzies identifies no 
basis for this Court to consider his unpreserved argument; 
therefore, the Court should disregard it. State v. Pinder, case 
no. 20030484, 2005 UT 15 147 (declining to address an unpreserved 
argument because Pinder did not argue plain error). 
Similarly, Mr. Menzies did not preserve most of the 
constitutional arguments he presses on appeal. In his opening 
memorandum in the proceedings below, Mr. Menzies relied only on 
open-courts cases; respondent addressed only that argument in his 
opposition. Mr. Menzies did not raise his additional 
constitutional arguments until he filed his reply memorandum. (R. 
3791-99, 3836-50). Mr. Menzies' constitutional arguments, 
presented for the-first time in his reply, were untimely. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1) (reply memoranda must be limited to addressing 
new material in opposition memoranda). Cf. State v. Kruger, 6 
P.3d 1116, 2000 UT 60 5120-21 (striking an argument first raised 
in an appellate reply brief because it did not address a new 
matter raised by the State). Consequently, those arguments are 
not preserved for appeal. See, e.g., State v. Pinder, case no. 
20030484, 2005 UT 15 145 (stating general rule that a party must 
timely object in order to preserve an issue for appellate 
review). 
7 
Division does not have to pay his appellate costs, the Court 
should order respondent Galetka to pay those costs. Cross-
Appellant's Brief at 24-29. However, the Division and Mr. 
Menzies agree that the Division must pay Mr. Menzies' appellate 
costs. The Division only disputes out of which fund it must pay 
those costs. Because no claim that the Division raises on appeal 
would relieve the Division of its obligation to pay Mr. Menzies' 
appellate costs, Mr. Menzies has no claim against respondent as 
an alternative source of funds for his appellate costs.6 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 (West 2004) provides for paid 
counsel to represent indigent persons sentenced to death who wish 
to challenge their capital murder convictions or death sentences. 
The statute charges the Division with administering the funds to 
pay the "costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation 
expenses." The statute further requires the Division to 
establish administrative rules governing the funds. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(c) (West 2004). 
The Division's rules create two funds: 1) an attorney fees 
Respondent moved in the rule 60(b) appeal to strike Mr. 
Menzies' record designation that included transcripts of 
previously untranscribed hearings from the underlying post-
conviction case. The Court deferred ruling on which of those 
transcripts it would allow to remain in the rule 60(b) appellate 
record. Addendum D. Nothing in this brief should be construed 
as waiving respondent's arguments in support of striking those 
transcripts from the record. Respondent will renew the motion to 
strike in conjunction with filing his brief in the rule 60(b) 
appeal. 
8 
and litigation costs fund ("fees and costs fund"), Utah 
Administrative Code R25-14-3 and 4; and 2) an expert witness, 
consultant, and investigator fund ("expert witness fund"), Utah 
Administrative Code R35-14-5. The fees and costs fund requires 
the Division to pay flat amounts upon the occurrence of specified 
objective events throughout a capital post-conviction proceeding, 
including an appeal. It also permits payment of additional funds 
at the rate of $100 per hour up to a maximum of $5,000, for 
"extraordinary services." Utah Administrative Code R25-14-4. 
The Division's rules's plain language requires all capital post-
conviction counsel to accept these amounts "as full compensation 
for the legal services performed and litigation costs incurred." 
Utah Administrative Code R25-14-3 (emphasis added).7 
The expert witness fund provides a maximum of $20,000 for 
expert witnesses, consultants, and investigators. The amounts 
actually paid up to the $20,000 maximum turns on the post-
conviction court's approval. Utah Administrative Code R25-14-5. 
The lower court ruled that the Division had to pay Mr. 
Menzies' appellate costs out of the expert witness fund. On 
7Mr. Menzies' counsel asserts that she has received $10,000 
thus far. She asserts that she has moved to obtain the 
additional $5,000 available for "extraordinary services." When 
she files Mr. Menzies' brief in case no. 20040289, she will 
receive an additional $5,000. When the Court issues the 
remittitur, she will receive another $2,500. Thus, Mr. Menzies' 
counsel will receive $17,500 and may receive up to $22,500 for 
representing petitioner on the rule 60(b) proceedings. 
9 
appeal, the Division argues only that it has paid the appellate 
costs and will continue to pay those costs by paying Mr. Menzies' 
counsel from the fees and costs fund. The Division does not 
argue that it does not have to pay Mr. Menzies' appellate costs 
at all. See generally, Appellant's Brief and Appellant's Reply 
Brief. 
If the Division loses the appeal, the district court's order 
directing the Division to pay appellate costs from the 
investigative funds will stand. If the Division wins its appeal, 
it will be because this Court agrees that the Division has paid 
and will continue to pay the appellate costs from the fees and 
costs fund. There is no possible outcome in this appeal where 
the Division will avoid paying Mr. Menzies' appellate costs for 
transcripts and printing.8 
The cross-appeal does not seek alternative payment from 
respondent; it seeks a double recovery: one from the Division, 
8As stated in footnote 6, the Court deferred ruling on 
respondent's motion to strike in the rule 60(b) appeal. The 
Court also ruled, however, that Mr. Menzies' counsel will have to 
repay the costs of preparing any transcript that the Court 
ultimately strikes from the record. Thus, irrespective of the 
outcome in this appeal, Mr. Menzies' counsel may still have to 
repay most and maybe all of the transcription costs at issue. 
10 
and a second from respondent. Mr. Menzies cites no authority to 
support reaching that result.9 
DATED March 9, 2005. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
A. THOMAS7 BRUNKER 
ERIN RILEY 
Assistant Attorneys General 
9Of course, if the Division wins the appeal, it will reduce 
the amount Mr. Menzies' counsel will receive for her time. Mr. 
Menzies cannot rely on that outcome to impose on respondent a 
second recovery for Mr. Menzies' litigation expenses. If Mr. 
Menzies' counsel believes that the flat fees paid out of the fee 
and costs fund insufficiently compensates her for her time and 
litigation costs, she must challenge the administrative rule 
itself. She has not done so. 
Moreover, Mr. Menzies' counsel cannot challenge the rule on 
this appeal. To challenge an administrative rule, Mr. Menzies' 
counsel must exhaust her administrative remedies before seeking 
judicial relief. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (West's 2004). 
She may bypass the administrative remedies only under limited 
circumstances. Id. Mr. Menzies' counsel has not exhausted her 
administrative remedies or argued that the circumstances of the 
case excuse her failure to do so. 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that, on March 9, 2005, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing CROSS-APPELLEE'S BRIEF was mailed by first-class 
mail, postage pre-paid, to Mr. Menzies' counsel, EIZABETH HUNT 
L.L.C., ELIZABETH HUNT, at 569 Browning Ave., Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84105; and was hand-delivered to Division of Finance's 
counsel, Assistant Attorney General Joel Ferre, at 160 East 300 
South, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857. 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
(i;W Any person aggrieved by a rule may obtain judicial review of the rule 
by filing a complaint with the county clerk in the district court where the 
person resides or in the district court in Salt Lake County. 
(b) Any person aggrieved by an agency's failure to comply with Section 
63_46a-3 may obtain judicial review of the agency's failure to comply by 
filing a complaint with the clerk of the district court where the person resides 
or in the district court in Salt Lake County. 
(2)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a person seeking judicial 
review under this section shall exhaust that person's administrative remedies by 
complying with the requirements of Section 63-46a-12 before filing the com-
plaint 
(b) When seeking judicial review of a rule, the person need not exhaust 
that person's administrative remedies if: 
(i) less than six months has passed since the date that the rule became 
effective and the person had submitted verbal or written comments on the 
rule to the agency during the public comment period; 
(ii) a statute granting rulemaking authority expressly exempts rules 
made under authority of that statute from compliance with Section 
63~46a-12; or 
(iii) compliance with Section 63-46a-12 would cause the person irrepa-
rable harm. 
(3)(a) In addition to the information required by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a complaint filed under this section shall contain: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the plaintiff; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the defendant agency; 
(iii) the name and mailing address of any other party joined in the action 
as a defendant; 
(iv) the text of the rule or proposed rule, if any; 
(v) an allegation that the person filing the complaint has either exhaust-
ed the administrative remedies by complying with Section 63-46a-12 or 
met the requirements for waiver of exhaustion of administrative remedies 
established by Subsection (2)(b); 
(vi) the relief sought; and 
(vii) factual and legal allegations supporting the relief sought. 
(b)(i) The plaintiff shall serve a summons and a copy of the complaint as 
required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(ii) The defendants shall file a responsive pleading as required by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedures. 
(iii) The agency shall file the administrative record of the rule, if any, 
with its responsive pleading. 
(4) The district court may grant relief to the petitioner by: 
(a) declaring the rule invalid, if the court finds that: 
(i) the rule violates constitutional or statutory law or the agency does not 
have legal authority to make the rule; 
(ii) the rule is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole administrative record; or 
(iii) the agency did not follow proper rulemaking procedure; 
(b) declaring the rule nonapplicable to the petitioner; 
(c) remanding the matter to the agency for compliance with proper rule-
making procedures or further fact-finding; 
(d) ordering the agency to comply with Section 63-46a-3; 
(e) issuing a judicial stay or injunction to enjoin the agency from illegal 
action or action that would cause irreparable harm to the petitioner; or 
(f) any combination of Subsections (4)(a) through (e). 
(5) If the plaintiff meets the requirements of Subsection (2)(b), the district 
court may review and act on a complaint under this section whether or not the 
•nlaintiff ha<; r^nnpQtprl thf* acr^n^r ravimir 1-,-^A^^ o~~».:— £•*> *? * *» 
gf */0-ODa-v£i«* Appointments ana payment, ot counsej nx deatii penalty 
cases 
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and 
sentence has been affirmed on appeal shall be advised itf open coui^ on the 
recori i n ^ hearing scheduled no les4s than 30 days prior to the signing of the 
death warrant, Q£ ^ the provisions of this chapter allowing challenges J o the 
conviction and death sentence and the appointment of counsel for indigent 
defendants. 
(2)(aX If -a defendant requests the court to appoint counsel, the court^shall 
determine whether the defendant is indigent and make findings on the record 
regarding the defendant's indigency* if the court finds that the defendant is 
indigent,, it
 rshall promptly appoint counsel who is qualified to represent 
defendants in death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah' Rules of 
Criminal Procedure: 
(b) A defendant who wishes to reject the oifer of counsel shall be advised 
on the record by the court of the consequences of the rejection before the 
court may accept the rejection. 
(c) Costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation expenses incurred in 
providing the representation provided for in this section shall be paid from 
stake hinds by the Division of Finance according to rufes established1 pursuant 
ib Title 63, chapter 46a, UtaH Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Laws 1997* c. 76 §" 2, eff, Maj 5, 199/, 
(a) Pleadings., There shall be a- complaint; and *an answer;? a reply to a 
counterclaim; an answer to^  a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim^ & 
third-party complaint, if a person who was not anr original party is summoned undec 
the provisions of Rule 14; and^  a third-party answer, if a third-party complaint is* 
served. * No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may order a reply 
to an answer or a third-party answer. 
(b) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall Be by motion which, 
unless made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court commissioner,* 
shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing and state* 
succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief 
soughti 
(c) Memoranda. 
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except uncon-
tested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum. 
Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a party 
opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in oppositionr Within five days after 
service of the ^memorandum in opposition, the moving party may file a reply 
memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the memoran-/ 
dum in opposition. No other memoranda' will be considered without leave of court/ 
A party may attach a proposed order to its initial memorandum. 
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument without 
leave of the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of argument without 
leave of the court* The court may permit a party to file an over-length memoran-
dum upon ex parte application and a showing of good cause.* 
(c)(3) Content 
(ck3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgmpnt
 (shall 
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no 
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to relevant materials,*1 such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
Each fact set forth in the moving parly's memorandum is deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by "the responding party!" 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain 
a verbatim^ restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted/and 
may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the, 
moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an 
explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts set 
forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and 
numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or 
discovery materials. 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a 
table of contents and a table of authorities with page references. 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of 
documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party 
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision 
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing 
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was 
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a request, the 
motion will not be submitted for decision. 
<e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may 
request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit for 
decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption of the 
document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a hearing on a 
motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action or any claim or 
defense in the action unless the court finds that +hp m^imi ™ ^ ^ r ^ v * i 
(f)(1) An. order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order 
entered in writing, not included in a judgment: An order for the payment of money 
may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise 
provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the adverse party may be 
vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or without notice. Orders shaft 
state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's 
initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial' 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, 
within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties, a 
proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed 
order shall be filed within five days after service. The party preparing the order 
shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or upon expiration 
of the time to object. 
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. , A recommendation 
of a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A 
party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same manner 
as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made hj open court 
or, if the court commissioner takes the matter under advisement, ten days after the 
minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may respond to the 
objection in the same manner as responding to a motion. 
[Amended effective November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004] 
R25-14-3. Scope of Services. 
(1) All appointed counsel, by accepting the court appointment 
to represent an indigent client sentenced- to death and by 
presenting a Request for Payment to the Division of Finance, 
agree to provide all reasonable and necessary post- conviction 
legal services for the client, including timely filing an action 
under the provisions. of Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act and representing the client in all legal proceedings 
conducted thereafter including, i f requested by the client, an 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
(2) All appointed counsel agree to accept as full compensation 
for the legal services performed and litigation costs incurred 
the amounts provided -in the Schedule of Payments of Attorneys 
Fees found in Section R25-14-4 
R 2 5 -1 4 - 4 . S c h e d u 1 e o f P a y m e n t s c f A 1 1 o r i I e ^  s i " e e s . 
All counsel appointed to jointly represent a single client 
shall be paid, in the aggregate, according to the following 
schedule of payments upon certification to the Division of 
Finance that the specified legal service was performed or the 
specified events have occurred: 
(1) $5,000.00 upon appointment by the district court and 
presentation of a signed Request for Payment to the Division of 
Finance. 
(2) $5,000.00 upon timely filing a petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
(3) $10,000,00 after all discovery has been completed, all 
prehearing motions have been ruled upon, an J ,j ;!ate f >i an 
evidentiary hearing has been set; . 
(4) If an evidentiary hearing is required, $5,000.00 on the 
date the first witness is sworn. 
(5) $7,500.00 if an appeal is filed from a final order of the 
district court. $5,000.00 of the total shall be paid when the 
brief on behalf of the indigent person is filed and $2,500.00 
when the Utah Supreme Court finally rem: ts the case to the 
district court. 
[0) an aaainonai ree or i?iuu per nour, but in no event to 
exceed $5,000.00 in the aggregate, shall be paid if: 
(a) counsel satisfy the requirements of Rule 4-505, Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration; and 
(b) the district court finds: 
(i) that the appointed counsel provided extraordinary legal 
services that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of 
accepting the appointment, such as responding to or filing a 
petition for interlocutory appeal, and 
(ii) the services were both reasonable and necessary for the 
presentation of the clientfs claims. 
(c) These additional fees shall be paid upon approval by the 
district court and compliance with the provisions of this rule. 
R25-14-5. Payment of Reasonable Litigation Expenses. 
The Division of Finance shall pay reasonable litigation 
expenses not to exceed a total of $20,000.00 in any one case for 
court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants. 
Before payment is made for litigation expenses, the appointed 
counsel must submit a request for payment to the Division of 
Finance including: 
(1) a detailed invoice of all expenses for which payment is 
requested; and 
(2) written approval of the district court certifying that the 
expenses were both reasonable and necessary for the presentation 
of the client!s claims. 
Aaaendum B 
Thomas B. Brunker, #4 804 
Erin Riley, #8375 
Assistant Attorneys General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, #4 666 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Bldg. 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854" 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone': (801) 366-0180 
Respondent's counsel 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES,' 
Petitioner, 
v. 
HANK GALETKA, Utah State 
Prison Warden, 
Respondent. 
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 
: REQUIRE GOVERNMENT TO 
PAY FOR TRANSCRIPTS, 
: PRINTING AND COSTS FOR 
APPEAL 
- Judge P.-i 1 '•'.. Brian 
Case No. CG0106629 
R e s p o n d e n t, 1: ft r o u g 1 i c o u i 1 s e ] , s u b in i t s 11 I e f :> 11 o w i n g response 
to petitioner'' s motion to order "the government" to pay for 
transcripts and his costs * n vp-i"l, iir'lulhjj printing. 
It' appears that petitioner directs most of the argument to 
the Division of Finance, not respondent 
petitioner asks the Court to order respondent to pay for the 
200% MAR 17 I n 12= 31 
transcripts and "costs of appeal," including printing costs, 
respondent responds as follows: 
1. Petitioner should first seek reimbursement from the 
Division of Finance for all "costs of appeal." 
2. If the Division of Finance refuses to pay for 
transcripts of any hearing the Court held in these Utah R. Civ. 
P. 60(b) proceedings, beginning August 12, 2003, respondent will 
pay for the transcription if petitioner can establish the 
relevance of the particular, untranscribed hearing.1 
3. Petitioner has indicated that he is "inclined to obtain 
all transcripts," identifying transcripts dating back to March 6, 
1996. See addendum A. Respondent objects to ordering the 
transcription of hearings that pre-date the rule 60(b) 
proceedings. At this stage, petitioner only has the right to 
appeal the denial of rule 60(b) relief. Any hearings that 
petitioner failed to have transcribed and included in the record 
for the Court to consider in the rule 60(b) proceedings are 
irrelevant for appellate purposes. In addition, respondent 
objects to paying for transcripts of rule 60(b) hearings without 
petitioner first demonstrating that they are relevant to claims 
he wishes to pursue on appeal. 
Respondent has already paid for transcripts of several 
hearings. 
2 
I Petitioner also asks the Court to order "the government" 
I' j* </ fv»r transcripts iiom tl is criminal proceeding that have 
been lost. Respondent objects to the request. "The aovernment" 
did not lose Mi" I. J. riiio- o i pts and should nut have to Liar the 
burden of reproducing them. 
!» R e s p o n d e ri t o b j e z t s t • :: a i 1 y o r d e r i • :B q u i r i n g h i m t o pay for 
printing costs. None of the cases petitioner cites obligates the 
State • to pay the appxl i <•»•» p- " i * «iq * • ' L M JLyeiiL post-
conviction petitioners. Indeed, none of the cases involved 
indigent parties. Because petitioner cit- * n ) -njthoi'il y 
demonstrating that he has a right to printing at State expense, 
the Court should deny the request. 
SUBMITTKLi March I ' , m I . 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
x LT^A^^S^ 
Thomas Brunker 
Erin Riley 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Respondent's counsel 
3 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I certify that, on March 17, 2004, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing RESPONSE TO MOTION TO REQUIRE GOVERNMENT TO PAY 
FOR TRANSCRIPTS, PRINTING AND COSTS FOR APPEAL was mailed by 
first class mail, postage pre-paid, to petitioner's counsel, 
ELIZABETH HUNT, at P.O. Box 9419, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109-
0419, and was hand-delivered to Division of Finance's counsel, 
JOEL FERRE, at 160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114 
4 
ADDENDUM A 
From: "Liz Hunt" <elizabeth.hunt@comcast.net> 
To: "Tom Brunker" <TBRUNKER@utah gov> 
Date: 3/8/04 9 50AM 
Subject: Menzies transcripts 
Hi Tom. I am inclined to obtain all transcripts. 
In the civil case, this would include the following: 
3/6/96 (transcribed) 
7/16/96 (transcribed) 
9/16/96 (transcribed) 
1/29/97 
2/24/97 
11/3/97 
1/29/98 
2/13/98 
3/13/98 
7/15/98 
7/22/98 
8/21/03 (transcribed) 
9/2/03 
9/9/03 
9/22/03 (transcribed) 
11/6/03 
1/7/04 
1/15/04 
1/16/04 
2/26/04. 
At this point, I do not know which of the criminal transcripts are missing, or whether you have copies that 
can be duplicated to go into the record, or if laws require us to have them transcribed again. I also don't 
know how to distinguish between the two versions of the transcript, to ascertain what is in the record and 
what is missing, but have asked Joan Watt to help me figure that out. What are your thoughts on this? 
Addendum C 
v^uu 
rl Hendrickson 
sion Administrator 
Bartholomew, Clerk 
h Supreme Court 
»South State Street 
i. Box 140210 
t Lake City, Utah 84114-0210 
Re: R alph LxroyMeiizi.es v. Hank Guletka, Nc >. 20040360 SC 
ir Ms. Bartholomew: 
) office of the Salt Lake County District Attorney recently learned of the pendency of this appeal via receipt 
. courtesy copy (we assume) of "Responsive Brief of Appellee and Opening Brief of Cross Appellant", filed 
Elizabeth Hunt, Counsel for Mr. Menzies. 
aid brief at pages 24-29, Mr. Menzies seeks in the alternative that: "The District Attorney's Office or 
pondent should be required to provide the transcripts". 
: District Attorney's Office does not believe it is a party to the case. We have not received any notice other 
i the above referenced brief. We did not appear as a party in the trial court before Judge Brian and are not 
ject to that courts jurisdiction. 
) District Attorney was not served with Mr. Menzies May 3, 2004, Notice of Cross-Appeal in case No. 
106629 or on his January 3, 2005, Amended Request for Transcripts and Designation of Record (copies 
ched). 
J District Attorney does not waive proper service of process in this proceeding and will not appear as a party 
the first time on appeal. Accordingly, we will not be filing any brief or memorandum in this case. 
Very truly yours, 
Brent H. Cameron 
Deputy District Attorney 
Civil Division 
Elizabeth Hunt 
Assistant Attorney Generals, Tomas Brunker, Erin R iley, J oel Ferre 
D eputy District Attorney Kent Morgan 
CIVIL DIVISION 
Karl Hendrickson 
Division Administrator 
DISTRICT ATTORNE^-®W F GfTfS" 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY ' 
February 24, 2005 
*J 
SALT LHKE COUNTY 
Mary Ellen Sloan 
Assistant Division Administrator 
Elizabeth Hunt 
569 Browning Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Re: Menzies Vs. Guletka 
Dear Ms. Hunt: 
I received a copy of your letter to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court. I am sorry you did not receive the 
attachments to my letter. I am enclosing them for your information. 
hi addition, after I sent my letter, Tom Brunker faxed us a copy of your Amended Notice of Cross Appeal 
on which your mailing certificate indicated Kent Morgan was sent a copy. Kent informs me he does not 
remember receiving it. 
I am still not convinced that receipt of copies of some pleadings makes the County (DA) a party. The fact 
that we prosecuted the criminal case doesn't mean we are a party to a civil case involving Mr. Menzies 
and Mr. Guletka. Actions against the County (DA) begin by service of process upon the County Clerk 
with a corresponding return of service. I am unaware that this has occurred. 
I have discussed this matter with Ms. Pat Bartholomew, Clerk of the Supreme Court, and she also is 
confused as to whether the County (DA) is a party, but stated she would bring up the matter with the 
Court and get back to me with any request they have. 
Absent the Court requesting it, we again decline to file a brief or memorandum in this case. 
Very truly yours, 
Brent H. Cameron 
Deputy District Attorney 
Civil Division 
pc: Pat Bartholomew, Clerk, Utah Supreme Cpurt 
Assistant Attorney Generals, Thomas feunker, Erin Riley, Joel Ferre 
Deputy District Attorney's, Kent Morgan, John Soltis 
2001 South State Street, S3600 Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84190-1210 Telpnhnnp (WW AR^-IAOD FOV /QAI\ ACQ OC/C 
Addendum D 
i- I •;.:'i t^Ci^ti-
I UN 3 0 2004 i 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUN 3 0 2Q0k 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Ralph Leroy Menzies, 
Appellant, 
v. Case No. 20040289-SC 
Hank Galetka, Utah State 
Prison Warden, 
Appellee. 
ORDER 
Before the Court is Appellee's motion to strike Appellant's 
designation of record. The motion is denied in part and granted 
in part. The State shall be required to provide a transcript for 
each hearing described by affidavit to be submitted by 
Appellant's counsel to the district court. The affidavit shall 
specify the manner in which each hearing was referenced during 
the rule 60(b) proceedings and its relevance to those 
proceedings. For purposes of plenary review of the denial of the 
rule 60 (b) motion, this court will only consider those record 
materials properly referenced in the rule 60(b) motion 
proceedings. In the event this Court finds that a transcript was 
not referenced during the rule 60(b) proceedings, but Appellant's 
counsel nevertheless required its production pursuant to 
affidavit, Appellant shall be required to reimburse the State for 
the costs of procuring the transcript. Appellant's motion for 
costs and attorney fees is denied. 
FOR THE COURT: 
L-^o-o 
Date latthew B. Durrant 
Jus t i ce 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on June 30, 2004, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
ELIZABETH HUNT 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1018 E MILLBERT AVE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106 
ERIN RILEY 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, WEST VALLEY 
ATTN: KAREN EELLS 
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
Dated this June 30, 2004. 
asr^-JT }JXJL^/(X^\ JU^> 
y Clerk 
Case No. 20040289 
THIRD DISTRICT, WEST VALLEY, 030106629 
